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Abstract: Some important elements of common property theory include a 
focus on individual communities or user groups, local level adjudication of 
conflicts, local autonomy in rule making, physical harvests, and low levels of 
articulation with markets. We present a case study of multi-scale collective 
action around indigenous/community conserved areas (ICCAs) in Oaxaca, 
Mexico that suggests a modification of these components of common property 
theory. A multi-community ICCA in Oaxaca demonstrates the importance of 
inter-community collective action as key link in multi-scale governance, that 
conflicts are often negotiated in multiple arenas, that rules emerge at multiple 
scales, and that management for conservation and environmental services 
implies no physical harvests. Realizing economic gains from ICCAs for strict 
conservation may require something very different than traditional natural 
resource management. It requires intense engagement with extensive networks 
of government and civil society actors and new forms of community and inter-
community collection action, or multi-scale governance. Multi-scale governance 
is built on trust and social capital at multiple scales and also constitutes collective 
action at multiple scales. However, processes of multi-scale governance are also 
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necessarily “turbulent” with actors frequently having conflicting values and goals 
to be negotiated. We present an analytic history of the process of emergence of 
community and inter-community collective action around strict conservation and 
examples of internal and external turbulence. We argue that this case study and 
other literature requires an extensions of the constitutive elements of common 
property theory.
Keywords: Common property, indigenous/community conserved areas, multi-
scale governance, social capital, turbulence.
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1. Introduction
The central purpose of common property theory is to explain the evolution 
of institutions for collective action (Ostrom 1990), but the focus has been 
overwhelmingly on the critical enabling conditions for collective action by 
individual local communities or user groups (Baland and Plateau 1996; Agrawal 
2001). Other levels and scales are seen only as supporting in a “nested” fashion 
the local scale, through “nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, 
governance” (Agrawal 2001). In this nested world, conflict is best mediated by 
“availability of low cost adjudication” in “local arenas” (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 
2001, p. 1654). The role of locally devised rules as a part of this process is also 
central, although this sits uneasily with the frequent reality of the “co-production” 
of rules at the nested levels of enforcement and governance (Fox 1996; Ostrom 
1996). Common property theory is also substantially based on the assumption 
that user groups or communities are physically harvesting resources from the 
environment, whether forests, fisheries, pastures or other productive sectors of 
nature (Ostrom 1990, 2005; Agrawal 2001). A final central element of common 
property theory important for this paper is that common property institutions 
function best when there is “low levels of articulation with external markets” 
(Agrawal 2001).
We have above singled several aspects of the many “critical enabling conditions” 
(Agrawal 2001) or constitutive characteristics of success on the commons: the 
locus of collective action, the role of higher “nested” scales, the resolution of 
conflicts, locally devised rules, physical harvests, and the role of markets. We 
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do so because we here present a case study of common property management 
that we argue represents a heuristic, outlier case (George and Bennett 2005) that 
has characteristics and outcomes not anticipated by traditional theory. We present 
a case study of multi-scale collective action around indigenous/community 
conserved areas in Oaxaca, Mexico. We present data and analyze the emergence 
of collective action at the community, inter-community and higher governance 
scales and levels (Termeer et al. 2010) and what we call “turbulence” in the 
case of the Natural Resource Committee of the Upper Chinantla (CORENCHI), 
a six-community organization in the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca, Mexico (Martin 
et al. 2010)1. This case study is an example of collective action at multiple scales, 
community and inter-community organizational processes that have established 
contiguous indigenous/community conserved areas (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2004) based on the absence of harvesting and strict conservation on 77% of 
their 34,908 ha of territory. This process has required integrating rules from 
multiple scales and extensive negotiations of conflicts in multiple arenas to access 
government programs and markets for environmental services (Molina-González 
2011).
Our case study begins by analyzing collective action at the level of a 
community, an accustomed focus of attention. Community governance supplies 
the foundations of trust that permit multi-scale collective action to happen, 
although communities may be highly turbulent in their decision-making. However, 
communities may also have “a structure of social interaction characterized by 
high entry and exit costs and non-anonymous relationships among members” and 
“multilateral enforcement of group norms” and other elements that can predispose 
to cooperation and lower the costs of collective action and overcome free-rider 
problems by direct monitoring and sanctioning (Bowles and Gintis 1998, 2002, 
p. 434). In Mexico, these possible tendencies are reinforced by the structure of 
governance mandated by agrarian law, where assemblies of all rights holders are 
required to meet at least twice a year, although well-functioning communities 
commonly meet monthly, as in our case study.
We then go on to discuss the little analyzed process of inter-community 
collective action. As Fox (1996) has noted for Mexico, dense social capital at the 
community level can be highly segmented spatially. Neighboring communities 
in many places in the world frequently have histories of conflict and tension over 
territories and resources. The emergence of inter-community collective action 
is not the norm since it must “overcome the socially constructed constraints 
of locally confined solidarities” (Fox 1996, p. 1091). However, despite a few 
examples (Antinori and Garcia-Lopez 2008; Paudel et al. 2010), inter-community 
collective action has been little considered in the literature. We then examine 
the emergence of inter-community or second level community organizations 
1
 In 2010 a seventh community joined CORENCHI, but we confine our analysis here to the six 
communities that founded the organization.
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as a key element in strong networks of multi-scale governance (Berkes 2007; 
Cronkleton et al. 2011; Duran et al. 2011). Multi-scale governance is more 
often invoked than developed as a concept, but we suggest that multi-scale 
governance be used to incorporate community collective action, the key link 
of inter-community collective action, and then larger structures of “supportive 
external sanctioning institutions”, “appropriate levels of external aid” and “nested 
levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance” (Agrawal 2001, 
p. 1654), by government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and bilaterial 
and multilateral agencies. This conception assumes the minimalist governance 
criteria that central governments should not undermine local authority but also 
include the other levels and scales which are constitutive of management of the 
commons in the modern cross-scale world (Berkes 2007). This conception of 
multi-scale governance also includes the coproduction of rules by multiple actors 
at multiple scales (Fox 1996; Ostrom 1996), including government-provided 
spaces to develop local rule autonomy, but within a framework where many 
important management rules originate in formal national and international laws 
and programs.
Using the concept of multi-scale governance to incorporate all of the 
mentioned elements can also serve to step away from the use of the concept of 
“nested” with its unfortunate connotations of domestic harmony in governance. 
We propose the term “turbulence” as a characterization of the linked process 
of support, appropriation, provision, enforcement and governance where actors 
frequently have conflicting values and goals to be negotiated (Carley and 
Christie 1992; Means and Josayma 2002; Alcorn et al. 2003). The multiple scale 
processes of constructing governance are characterized by actors performing 
in “uncoordinated and dissonant ways in attempting to meet their individual 
objectives, typically externalizing as many of the costs and internalizing as 
many of the benefits of their actions as they can” (Carley and Christie 1992, 
p. 156). The notion of turbulence is related to the idea of power conflict in 
cross-scale networks (Adger et al. 2005) but is more general, and in our case 
territorial ownership and some degree of rule-making autonomy within multi-
scale governance, as we shall see below, mitigates power differentials. Multi-
scale governance is collective and turbulent action that requires both the prior 
existence and strengthening of trust and social capital at multiple levels and 
scales from local to international (Adger 2003; Andersson et al. 2005; Termeer 
et al. 2010; Duran et al. 2011). This conception of turbulent multi-scale governance 
goes beyond “low cost adjudication” in conflict resolution and embraces the idea 
that conflict resolution is a process of on-going negotiations between actors in 
multiple arenas rather than discrete conflicts to be adjudicated. This also assumes 
increasing confidence on the part of community and inter-community actors to 
negotiate with and challenge other levels of governance (Alcorn et al. 2003). 
It presumes community-based management, less of natural resources, than of 
extensive networks of government and civil society actors and new forms of 
community and inter-community collective action.
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Our case study also requires extensions of common property theory to include 
collective action around common properties for strict conservation. Ostrom’s 
(2009) framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological resource 
systems focuses on “users” and “harvests” and “products”. The implications of 
common property management focused on strict conservation are not considered. 
Conservation with little or no extraction does not produce physical harvests, 
and markets for it are usually framed as “environmental services” to be paid by 
users in a market or by government beyond the territorial boundaries (Muradian 
et al. 2010). Realizing income from these sources requires deep involvement in 
multi-scale governance for the owners of the conserved resource to realize any 
monetary benefit from the “products”. Realizing economic gains from ICCAs for 
strict conservation may require something very different than traditional natural 
resource management, and may require a high level of articulation with that most 
challenging of contemporary markets, environmental services. Sacred groves in 
India are a traditional expression of commons conservation, but are characterized 
as threatened precisely because they generate few economic benefits and are not 
recognized at multiple levels (Chandrakanth et al. 2004).
Our task is to define the constitutive elements (Goertz 2005) of the expansion 
of common property theory and to tentatively identify the variables which appear 
to have led to this outcome unanticipated in the literature. It is an example of both 
community and inter-community collective action around strict conservation, 
where “harvesting” of any kind is explicitly disallowed, where the realization of 
economic gains from “conservation” as an ecosystem service can only be realized 
by increasing sophistication in negotiations with multiple actors.
Our case study also highlights the emerging importance of ICCAs (Berkes 
2009; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2010; Brown and Kothari 2011; Martin et al. 
2011) as a common property management option. The IUCN has defined them as 
“natural and modified ecosystems, including significant biodiversity, ecological 
services and cultural values, voluntarily conserved by indigenous peoples and 
local and mobile communities through customary laws or other effective means” 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004, p. xv). Mexico has been a world leader in the 
formal recognition of ICCAs, building on its achievements in community forest 
management for timber production (Bray et al. 2006). Mexico adopted in 2008 
a new national protected area category called “voluntary conservation areas” 
(including private reserves) and recognizes them as part of the national protected 
areas system (Martin et al. 2010). Mexico’s Natural Protected Areas Commission 
(CONANP) has currently certified 85 communities in a total of 212,580 ha. Of 
these, 46 certifications (54% of the total) and 108,763 ha (51%) are certified on 
community lands in the state of Oaxaca2. The occurrence of so many ICCAs in 
Oaxaca is not an accident. Oaxaca is heavily indigenous and historically has 
had land management practices which tend towards conservation of forest and 
2
 http://www.conanp.gob.mx/que_hacemos/listado_areas.php; accessed 8/2/11. 
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other vegetation cover (Boege 2008). In recent decades, in the Sierra Norte 
and elsewhere in Oaxaca, a variety of traditional and contemporary community 
management practices have conserved forests while generating income for local 
communities (Robson 2007). Oaxaca is also the most biodiverse state in Mexico, 
but with only 5.2% of its territory under federal protection (García-Mendoza 
et al. 2004; Martínez-Hernández 2010), and the emergence of ICCAs only 
provides formal recognition that traditional community practices have conserved 
forest cover and biodiversity in this area.
2. Methods
2.1. Context and study site
Our study is focused on a group of six Chinantec indigenous communities with 
membership in an inter-community organization called the Natural Resources 
Committee of the Upper Chinantla (Comité de Recursos Naturales de la 
Chinantla Alta-CORENCHI), legally established in 2005 with six communities: 
Santa Cruz Tepetotutla (Santa Cruz), San Antonio el Barrio (el Barrio), San 
Pedro Tlatepusco (San Pedro), Santiago Tlatepusco (Santiago), San Antonio 
Analco (Analco) and Nopalera Rosario (Nopalera) (Figure 1). Community 
lands are contiguous and located in the Upper Chinantla subregion of the Sierra 
Norte of Oaxaca, Mexico (Figure 1) which form part of the Papaloapan River 
watershed. The total area is 34,907 ha with 26,770 ha certified as a Indigenous/
Community Conserved Areas by the National Commission of Natural Protected 
Areas (CONANP) by 2011 (Table 1), the largest single block of certified ICCAs 
in Mexico.
The region has large masses of intact contiguous forests along an elevation 
gradient from around 200 to over 3000 meters above sea level and includes 
perennial tropical forest, broadleaf montane rainforest, evergreen cloud forest, 
and pine-oak-liquidambar forest. Due to biogeographic processes, the complex 
topography, and climate, the community forests present wide diversity in types, 
transition zones, and tree communities with high species richness and structural 
complexity, particularly of patches of Liquidambar, Engelhardtia, Cirilla, 
and great diversity in the families of Lauracea and Rubiaceae (Rzedowski and 
Palacios 1977; Meave et al. 2006), and are widely considered to be of very high 
conservation value. Floristic checklists report around 3000 species of vascular 
plants with neotropical origins, which is around 12% of the total of flora Mexicana 
(Meave et al. unpublished). Recently, the landscape has been shown to support 
jaguars (Panthera onca) and other felines (Figel et al. 2011). The region is 
considering a hot spot of biodiversity (CONABIO 2007). In the zoned agricultural 
areas there are areas of rotating corn agriculture and coffee plantations that harbor 
multiple genetic diversity of crops like maize, chili, wild greens, domestic and 
semi-domestic avocado varieties, and secondary succession trees, among many 
others (Bost 2009; Hite 2011).
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Table 1: CORENCHI community territories, ICCA area and PHS areas
Community Territory3 ICCA area (ha)4/date5 Payment for hydrological services6/date7
Nopalera del Rosario 5,329.55 4200/2009 2,299.00/2007
San Antonio Analco 2,677.14 2050/2011 1,473.71/2007
San Antonio del Barrio 2,310.82 1500/2004 1,150.98/2004; 400.10/2007*
San Pedro Tlatepusco 6,289.68 5050/2004 2,534.13/2004; 1,443.542/2007*
Santiago Tlatepusco 5,945.60 4300/2004 1,969.05/2004; 852.63/2007*
Santa Cruz Tepetotutla 12,372.80 9670/2004 2,534.67/2004; 1,398.139/2007*
Total 34,907.99 26,770.00 16,056.96
*Additional area for PH.
Figure 1: Chinantla study site where six communities analyzed are located the dotted line refers 
to different municipalities.
3
 Source: Official Community Rules (Estatutos);
4
 Source: Ortega del Valle et al. 2010
5
 Dates when documents were made official
6
 Source: Geoconservación A.C.;
7
 Dates when documents were made official
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Figure 2: Assembly’s basic governance structure mandated by Mexican Agrarian Law. 
CORENCHI Delegates added in 2008.
The population density is low, with high percentages of young people, but 
also heavily impacted by emigration, which has reduced populations and relieved 
pressure on land. Education levels are low, an average of 4.6 years (INEGI 2005). 
Most men are subsistence corn farmers with income historically coming primarily 
from coffee cultivation. In recent years, various government support programs and 
remittances have replaced coffee as the principal source of cash income (Nieratka 
2011). Community governance is a blend of traditional practices and structures 
mandated by Mexican agrarian law (Bray et al. 2006). The main decision-making 
body is the General Assembly, and the executor of Assembly decisions is the 
Comisariado (composed of a president, secretary and treasurer) and an Oversight 
Council (composed of a president and two secretaries) who carry out the decisions 
of the Assembly (Figure 2). The Comisariado and the Oversight Council are 
elected democratically for three-year terms, although the Assembly can reduce 
the period for non-performance. Crucially, it is the Assembly that establishes rules 
for land use and governs access and use of the forest common property, although 
constrained by agrarian and forest law. Government agencies, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and multilateral agencies also are important players and 
we classify them as “local” (normally state-level), “national” (usually with offices 
in Mexico City), and international (main offices abroad; including bilaterial and 
multilateral agencies).
The case study was found opportunistically (George and Bennett 2005) with 
the authors identifying it as an unusual case of collective inter-community action 
around conservation. We visited the communities several times per year, held 
informal interviews with external stakeholders and community leaders, including 
current and past leaders of CORENCHI, and five annual graduate field courses 
(2006–2011). We also attended at least three CORENCHI assemblies annually 
from 2008 to 2011 and participated in various community Assembly meetings. We 
also had access to an extensive gray literature produced by NGOs, government 
agencies, and conducted 36 semi structured interviews during 2010–2011 with 
CORENCHI community leaders and additional ones with key external actors, 
which are more extensively analyzed in Molina-González (2011). 
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3. Results
Our results will consist of (1) an analytic narrative of the emergence of collective 
action at the community level, inter-community and other levels divided into two 
periods, 1980–2000 (with some reference to earlier periods) and 2000–2010, and 
(2) brief analytic narratives of two case studies of turbulence and negotiation of 
conflicts in multi-scale governance. The first is an example of turbulence internal 
to the organization at the inter-community scale and the second turbulence 
between the organization and external stakeholders.
3.1. Period I: 1980–2000
Before the 1980s, the CORENCHI communities were remote, roadless, and 
had limited interaction with the Mexican nation (De Teresa 2011). In the 1930s, 
Chinantec communities were so mistrustful that the inhabitants fled to the forest 
when outsiders came into the community (Bevan 1938). Many of the communities 
had a history of authoritarian leaders and conflicts with neighbors, with deadly 
boundary disputes between villages. Informal land use rules existed around corn 
and coffee lands, but few rules existed on natural resource extraction, because 
soil and forest resources were abundant and there was a relatively low population. 
In the 1970s, the first sustained government program in the region other than in 
public education came from the Mexican Coffee Institute (INMECAFE) which 
expanded coffee as a cash crop in the community and helped to build trust in 
outside institutions (Figure 3; Hite 2011). In the early 1980s, another government 
program, the Rural Food Supply Network (DICONSA), sent an organizer into the 
communities of the region to establish non-profit communal stores to mitigate 
erratic and expensive food supplies (Fox 2007). The DICONSA community 
organizer also established relationships of trust and in the mid-1980s supported 
members of the communities of Santa Cruz Tepetotutla and Santiago Tlatepusco 
to establish community development cooperatives that would later become 
specialized in coffee marketing (Mutersbaugh 2002). In 1990, the disappearance 
of INMECAFE because of neoliberal reforms and the collapse of the International 
Coffee Agreement led to a dramatic fall and instability in coffee prices for the last 
two decades (Bray et al. 2002). This led to: 1) efforts to expand coffee marketing 
cooperatives at the local and state level with the emergence of a state-wide 
coordination of coffee producers named as Local NGO-1 (Figure 3) in the 1990s 
and the development of organic coffee as a higher-value alternative; and 2) a rapid 
increase in emigration from the communities in search of cash income to replace 
coffee.
In the 1990s, the first NGOs arrived in the communities. In the early 1990s, 
National NGO (NNGO-2), a research-action NGO affiliated with the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico began carrying out research in the communities 
of Santa Cruz and Santiago. Later in the 1990s, Local (LNGO-3), supported in 
part by the US government agency the Inter-American Foundation, began to 
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provide training workshops and funds for small projects in domestic industries in 
several of the communities. The community development cooperative established 
with support from the DICONSA organizer, composed of only a small percentage 
of the community, had been seen as a threat by both internal and external political 
forces in the region and was under constant hostility. However, “In spite of social 
pressure, the cooperative managed to consolidate itself as a minority organization 
within the village” (van der Wal 1999, p. 3). 
As the 1990s progressed, the cooperative also began to more aggressively 
promote a position of strong communal cooperation in the Assembly while 
small-scale cattle ranchers pushed for privatization of agricultural lands, with 
most community members not choosing sides (Mutersbaugh 2002). Also in the 
1990s, LNGO-3 advisors took community leaders for meetings with high state 
government officials about community needs, particularly on the construction of 
a road into Santa Cruz, giving them new confidence in dealing with government 
(CAMPO 2005). From 1993 to 1996 botanical researchers from the Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) carried out fieldwork in Santa Cruz and 
hired local guides, some of whom began to gain an understanding of the scientific 
and ecological value of community forests. These guides would later emerge as 
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some of the most forceful early leaders of the CORENCHI organizational process. 
Thus, by 2000 community leaders had gained new confidence in dealing with 
outsiders, had begun to see some external benefits flowing, and began to gain a 
new appreciation of the conservation value of their forests, and that conservation 
might be used to generate income to reduce emigration. However, continued deep 
mistrust in the Assembly was also a recurring theme in interactions with outsiders. 
It should also be noted that the evolution of collective action at the community 
level was in a sub-coalition of community members in the production cooperative, 
with community efforts focused on road building and bringing in electricity, but 
none of these had a conservation focus. Figure 3 indicates that external actors who 
helped influence community governance began to appear, but at a much lower 
density than would occur in the subsequent decade.
3.2. Period 2: 2000–2010
Beginning around 2000, growing international concern over degradation and 
deforestation brought new national and international attention to the large intact 
forests of the Chinantla, and resulted in a rapid expansion in the number of external 
actors interested in the region, and a corresponding much greater density of the 
support networks in multi-scale governance (Figure 4). We will continue to focus 
on processes in Santa Cruz as the first leader of CORENCHI.
By the late 1990s, earlier informal community rules for forest conservation 
(such as leaving large stands of Pinus chiapensis standing in the agricultural areas) 
were joined by a new sensitivity to environmental management brought by organic 
coffee production (Molina-González 2011). In 1999 they proposed a project for 
sustainable logging in the forests, as was practiced in many other communities in 
Sierra Norte (Bray 1991). A government program suggested that before logging 
it would be useful to carry out a land use planning exercise called a Community 
Territory Land – Use Zoning (Ordenamiento Territorial Comunitario – OTC) (Anta 
et al. 2006). Thus, in 2000 a Mexican government-World Bank program called 
the Program for Conservation and Forest Management (PROCYMAF) funded a 
Oaxaca NGO (LNGO-4) to carry out the OTC for Santa Cruz. In the following 
year the same NGO produced a logging management plan. This was halted after 
one year both because of government concerns about logging the environmentally 
protected Pinus chiapensis and the fact that a community leader absconded with 
funds, causing the community to lose interest in physical harvests from the forest. 
In the meantime, the simmering dispute in the community between the proponents 
of community collective action and the cattle-raising privatizing faction continued, 
and in 2003, for the first time, the community elected a slate of leaders who were 
strongly identified with the communal faction and who had become imbued with a 
sense of the ecological importance of their common property forests through their 
work with the UNAM ecological researchers.
With the support of LNGO-4, the new leadership took the OTC and began 
to try and develop community statutes, local rules required by national agrarian 
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legislation, as a foundation for more systematic land use planning, beginning the 
period where community assemblies were largely focused for the first time on the 
common property forest. In 2002, multilateral interest in the Chinantla manifested 
itself when the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) funded the Mexico office 
of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to carry out projects in 
natural resource management in three regions of Mexico, including the Chinantla, 
through a program called Integrated Ecosystem Management (Manejo Integral 
de Ecosistemas-MIE) (2001–2009). MIE issued a call for proposals to NGOs 
for work in the region, and the newly formed Local NGO-6, won the proposal 
to start work in three communities, Santa Cruz, el Barrio, and Santiago. During 
this period, the more development-oriented LNGO-4 began to reduce its presence 
in the community, and the more conservation-oriented LNGO-6, with funding 
from MIE, began to assume a more prominent role as a community advisor. The 
new community leadership was strengthened in its belief in the inherent value 
of conservation and its perception that conservation could produce income to 
counteract emigration due to continued instability in coffee prices. They had come 
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National NGO; LNGO=Local or State NGO).
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to believe in the conservation value of their forests and made the bet that ecological 
value could be translated to market value. Santa Cruz was thus very open to 
working with LNGO-6, and continued formalizing the OTC through community 
statutes, with support from PROCYMAF. Thus, government financing of an NGO 
supported the communities in devising local rules within a framework of national 
agrarian law. Because the small-scale cattle ranching interests remained strong, 
there were stormy discussions in community assembly meetings for two years 
over zoning of pasture lands and rights to hunt (with the communal group arguing 
that wildlife was in decline due to overhunting), areas in which communities had 
local rule-making autonomy. Santa Cruz finally adopted statutes in June, 2003 
that called for restrictions on all harvesting from what it now defined as a 9670 
ha ICCA (78.2% of its total territory of 12,372.8 ha; see Table 1). The statutes 
prohibited agriculture and hunting and called for a strict protectionist policy of 
“no extraction of plants, animals, fruits, seeds … timber and firewood” in the 
conservation area and required all community members to establish firebreaks 
around their corn fields, among other environmental measures. In the same period, 
and contrary to the welcoming reception in Santa Cruz, LNGO-6 found deep 
suspicion in el Barrio, as well as continued tensions over boundaries between 
Santa Cruz and el Barrio. LNGO-6 proposed to Santa Cruz leaders that el Barrio 
leaders be invited to one of the workshops to discuss the OTC and the statutes, 
and Santa Cruz reluctantly agreed. The leaders of el Barrio were impressed by the 
discussion and requested an OTC and statutes for their community, which was 
also carried out with funding from PROCYMAF. 
As Santa Cruz began to mature in its proposals, two new federal government 
programs opened up new opportunities. First, Mexico’s National Protected Areas 
Commission (CONANP) established a new program of certification of ICCAs. 
Also in 2004, Mexico’s National Forest Commission (CONAFOR) launched 
a new payment for hydrological services program (PHS) (Muñoz-Piña et al. 
2008; Nieratka 2011) which would make cash payments for conserving forests in 
watersheds. Despite deep concerns from some community members afraid that the 
program would imply losing control over their community lands, Santa Cruz, el 
Barrio, Santiago, San Pedro agreed to both programs. LNGO-6 had initially met 
with resistance and mistrust from the other communities in early meetings. But 
when leaders from Santa Cruz began accompanying them, relations and acceptance 
improved, and historical inter-community tensions were reduced. Subsequently, in 
2003 LNGO-6 used the same methodology of carrying out an OTC and developing 
community statutes in the communities of San Pedro and Santiago.
In the case of Santa Cruz, the conservation strategy had emerged from nearly 
two decades of struggle over the direction of community leadership, but first el 
Barrio and then the other two communities, after the initial mistrust, were rapidly 
convinced by Santa Cruz leaders and the promise of material benefits. By 2004 
the other three communities had carried out OTCs and had adopted very similar 
statutes to those in Santa Cruz that required strict conservation in their newly 
defined ICCAs. In late 2004, as a result of both community leadership and the 
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work of LNGO6, the first four communities signed a “Regional Community 
Agreement for the Conservation of the Natural Resources of the Perfume and 
Santiago River Watersheds”, signaling a new era of trust, social capital, and multi-
territorial governance between the neighboring communities and new interactions 
with NGO and government actors at higher scales. The agreement committed 
the four communities in the two neighboring watersheds to a community-based 
regional management plan with the same strict restrictions against extraction that 
were first contained in the community statutes elaborated in Santa Cruz. These 
community-imposed restrictions went beyond anything required in the ICCAs 
or the PHS program, neither one of which prohibited hunting, for example. 
The ecological discourse, and clearly deep belief, on the part of some of the 
CORENCHI leadership is exemplified by the following quote, where they fashion 
a discourse of conservation continuity with traditional practices, “Our ancestors 
left as a legacy the value of community conservation. In our community the labor 
of natural resource conservation transcends the generations. The forest for us is the 
“cradle of the jaguar’, where bird songs are born and every kind of wildlife exists. 
So taking care of the pheasant’s habitat, the red brocket deer, jaguar, armadillo, 
woodcocks, is to take care of our territory” (CONAFOR 2010).
In 2005, the two neighboring communities of Analco and Nopalera, who had 
also initially shown great mistrust of external actors when first approached about 
the effort, but were won over by persistence efforts by a Santa Cruz leader, signed 
the agreement and formed CORENCHI, making it a six community organization 
with a total 34,907 ha, of which 26,770 ha are under strict community protection 
(Ortega del Valle et al. 2010), and as of 2011 all six certified as ICCAs by 
CONANP. The objectives of the organization included the “strengthening of the 
communities to conserve and rationally use their natural resources for the benefit 
of its families through seeking financing” and establishing agreements with 
government agencies and international organizations, clearly signaling the goal 
of obtaining funding through interactions and negotiations with external actors 
at multiple levels. The most important immediate result came from the Mexican 
government’s PHS program. By 2007, a total of 16,056 ha were receiving payment 
under the PHS (Table 1). The PHS program has resulted in substantial flows of 
financial resources into the CORENCHI communities and CORENCHI founding 
leaders saw these payments as validating their strategy of conservation as a way 
to “harvest” financial resources for their conservation initiatives. For example, 
the communities of Santa Cruz and San Pedro received some US$570,000 dollars 
apiece during the 2004–2010 period and, although not large on a per capita basis, 
these payments have had a significant poverty alleviation effect (Nieratka 2011). 
The program gives contracts for five year periods and it has now been renewed 
once, but there are uncertainties about its future to be discussed further below. In 
addition to the PHS program, the CORENCHI communities have received myriad 
smaller income generation, food production, and ecotourism project support from 
the national indigenous agency and a state government biodiversity program 
called COINBIO (Figure 4).
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As the organizational and ecosystem management accomplishments of 
CORENCHI became known, other actors entered the picture. CONANP recruited 
the philanthropic arm of Mexico’s largest brewery, whose plant on the Papaloapan 
River drew water from this watershed, to do work in the community. The brewery 
foundation (Fundación Modelo) supported a National NGO (NNGO-7) to develop 
ecotourism in Santa Cruz, financing the building of a cabin and equipment and 
training for guides. In 2007, a small international NGO (SINGO-8) also began 
working in the region on participatory video, community research, training on 
ICCA management, and some advocacy issues. Researchers were also attracted 
and field courses and student research were carried out from US and Mexican 
universities (Figel et al. 2011; Hite 2011; Molina-González 2011; Nieratka 2011; 
Velasco 2011), among others. Figure 4 shows the very high-density of multi-scale 
support which emerged to help CORENCHI govern its land use at the community 
and regional level. However, the coming together in collective action and multi-
scale governance of multiple actors in government and civil society has not been so 
much “nested” as turbulent with frequent conflicts and negotiations. CORENCHI 
leadership has had to become increasingly sophisticated at negotiating these 
conflicts. Of many possible instances, we will now briefly review two cases of 
turbulence, one which we will term internal, around establishing the rules for 
leadership of CORENCHI and the second, external, around an effort by CONANP 
to convince the communities to agree to the declaration of a Biosphere Reserve in 
addition to the ICCAs.
3.3. Internal turbulence: establishing and maintaining rules of leadership 
for CORENCHI
CORENCHI’s founding statutes established that the leadership of CORENCHI 
would be composed of the Presidents of the Comisariado of each community, 
modeling other inter-community organizations in Mexico, but that they would 
serve two year terms (instead of three). Thus, for the first year or so of its 
existence CORENCHI was administered by the six Comisariado Presidents, who 
had elected the leader of Santa Cruz with a long trajectory as a cooperative leader 
and strong conservation beliefs, as its President. However, there emerged a timing 
problem. The new CORENCHI leader was ending his period as the Comisariado 
of Santa Cruz in 2007, but still had another year to go as CORENCHI President. 
By the statutes, he could not continue as President of CORENCHI if he was not 
President of the Comisariado. This leader was considered by LNGO-6 to be a key 
person in the early success of CORENCHI, and it could be damaging to the young 
organization that he leave. So it was proposed at a meeting in June, 2007 that the 
statutes be revised to allow the soon-to-be former Comisariado to continue on 
for one more year as CORENCHI President. However, opposition arose from 
the small-scale cattle ranching interests among the Comisariados. This led to a 
protracted period of discussion, negotiations, and tension within CORENCHI and 
with their advisors over what the rules of leadership of the organization would 
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be, an arena where they had autonomy in decision-making. After six months 
of discussions and conflict resolution workshops convened by MIE, the UNDP 
program, a proposal from MIE suggested that CORENCHI be composed of four 
delegates from each community, elected by the community assembly (Figure 2), 
and that the CORENCHI President be elected from those delegates, to side step the 
problem of coordinating the service periods of the Comisariado Presidents. The 
delegates would not hold any other office in their communities, and community 
Presidents would participate with a voice but no vote. These new leadership rules 
were incorporated into the statutes at a December, 2007 meeting where the new 
President was a delegate from Santa Cruz who proved to be an able leader, and 
that also decided to dedicate 5% of the funds received from PHS to CORENCHI 
expenses, giving it an economic foundation. Thus, a multilateral organization and 
a local NGO were key in supporting CORENCHI to develop new governance 
rules to resolve the leadership crisis.
3.4. External turbulence: community conserved areas or biosphere reserve?
NGOs had long seen this part of Sierra Norte as a candidate for the declaration 
of a Biosphere Reserve given its extensive intact blocks of cloud and montane 
tropical forest (Bray 1991). CONANP along with LNGO-6 had initially promoted 
the concept of ICCAs among the communities of CORENCHI and, as we have 
seen, CORENCHI accepted the CONANP certification of their ICCAs beginning 
in 2004 (Table 1). Nonetheless, as early as 2005 the Oaxaca office of CONANP 
began proposing the idea of a Biosphere Reserve in the Chinantla, arguing 
that it would receive greater resources and international prestige. By Mexican 
environmental law, ICCAs are granted by a process of certification that is in 
principal initiated by the communities and does not require a decree. A Biosphere 
Reserve, on the other hand, can be proposed by the government and requires 
a Presidential Decree, although community consultation is also legally required 
(LGEEPA 1988). CORENCHI was initially interested in the idea, and even sent 
a letter to the national Director of CONANP in 2005 expressing an interest in 
the possibility of a Reserve decree. The process would develop over the next 
four years and would become filled with tension and splits between government 
agencies and CORENCHI’s supporting NGOs over the issue of a decree. In the 
first years, the CORENCHI leadership was generally convinced that it would bring 
greater benefits to their communities, but as the proposal developed and came 
closer to reality splits among the external actors over the wisdom of accepting a 
decree drove the community assemblies to become more concerned that a Reserve 
would cause them to lose control or possession of their lands. CONANP sent a 
local consulting NGO (LNGO-9) into the CORENCHI communities to try and 
convince them of the advantages of a Biosphere Reserve in a series of meetings in 
late 2008 and early 2009. MIE, which had initially opposed the decree, eventually 
sided with CONANP in promoting it. 
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However, during the same period, the CORENCHI leadership approached 
the small international NGO (SINGO-8) that had begun working in the region in 
2007 and asked for some legal advice. SINGO-8 hired a lawyer who met with the 
Santa Cruz community assembly to discuss the legal implications of a Reserve, 
after that SINGO-8 and LNGO-6 discussed the issue in the other communities. 
SINGO-8 adopted a strong advocacy position against the decree. LNGO-6, which 
had been the principal advisor and supported by CONANP, entered into a crisis 
in its relationship with CONANP over its more moderate opposition to the decree 
and other issues. Some CORENCHI leaders were also taken to visit the Reserves 
in the states of Veracruz and Chiapas. From these visits they took away that the 
figure of the “Director” in a Biosphere Reserve would have had too much control 
over their rights to resources on their land. This was a confused and turbulent period 
with pressure from CONANP to accept a Biosphere Reserve, the CORENCHI 
leadership torn between CONANP and the fears of the community assemblies, 
and confused and tense relations between NGOs and NGOs and government 
agencies. Things came to a head at the 9th World Wilderness Congress in Mérida, 
Yucatan in November, 2009, when CORENCHI leaders announced publicly the 
sense of the assemblies that they did not want a Reserve decree. A month later, at 
a CORENCHI meeting in one of the communities, officials who had pushed the 
Reserve concept publically apologized to CORENCHI. The CORENCHI decision 
has been respected and there has been no further talk of a Biosphere Reserve for 
the region.
4. Discussion
We suggested in our introduction that CORENCHI presented an outlier case study 
within the literature on common property natural resource management. It is a case 
where communities managing their common property engaged first in turbulent 
collective action at the community level, and second in turbulent collective action 
at the inter-community level that overcame long-standing mistrust, to maximize 
benefits from a strategy of not harvesting from their forest common properties. 
They eventually placed their territories under a regional community coordinated 
management plan, and sought income from conservation through intensive 
articulation with extensive network of external actors at multiple scales, where 
relationships were also turbulent (Figure 4). This strategy derived both from the 
internalization of ecological notions of ecosystem value on the part of some leaders 
and the fact that the communities were losing population due to the instability 
of coffee prices beginning in the late 1980s. Conservation was perceived by 
some community leaders as a strategy to replace lost coffee income, but one that 
required a high level of articulation with external sources of funding. Emigration 
was perceived as a threat to community life, but it also reduced pressure on 
agricultural lands, lowering the opportunity costs for conservation. In response to 
the opportunities for conservation and its possible economic benefits, the external 
actors around the CORENCHI communities have come together in a frequently 
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conflictive and turbulent process to help the communities achieve the goals of 
both conservation and higher incomes. Conflicts were resolved in both local 
and national arenas, such as an international conservation congress, not through 
“adjudication” but through intense discussions and negotiations in contexts of 
constant turbulence. It is a measure of the resilience of the communities that the 
process has continued moving forward despite all of the turbulence (Folke 2006; 
Magis 2010).
The rules which are governing this process have been produced both by 
government agencies and by the communities. The basic governing institutions at 
the community level are mandated by agrarian law, including the requirement that 
they have community statutes, but are also informed by much older community 
traditions. The rules governing ICCAs and the PHS program come from above 
and the communities have had to adapt to their requirements, with some confusion 
and turbulence over exactly what the requirements are. The communities however, 
had the space to write community statutes which responded to the majority 
interests at the time and have had to evolve and adjust rules around leadership of 
CORENCHI, with no guidance in the laws as to how to structure the leadership, 
but with support from a multilateral organization and a local NGO, a case of the 
co-production of governance (Ostrom 1996). One of the significant consequences 
of this inter-community collective actions was to improve the “fit” between the 
ecosystems and the management structure, placing the forest territories of the 
six contiguous communities under similar management rules, creating a form of 
regional common property (Folke et al. 2007).
The process remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. The PSA program 
is undergoing a policy transition to try and create markets for hydrological 
services rather than direct government payment, and is now focusing on the 
mechanism of “Joint Funds” (Fondos Concurrentes). Previously, funds came 
from a tax on water users nationally as well as World Bank and Mexican 
government sources (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008) but funding at those levels is 
not likely to continue. In the Fondos Concurrentes approach the government 
contributes 50% to a fund for a given region and downstream users or other 
interested stakeholders contribute 50% (Nieratka 2011). In 2010 CORENCHI 
communities received their first payment through this mechanism but it is not 
yet clear if it will allow for payments to continue at the same levels they have 
until now. There are also uncertainties around the policies surrounding the 
ICCA program. A May, 2008 amendment to the environmental law (LGEEPA) 
provided legal support to the ICCAs and incorporated them formally into the 
national protected areas system, but the regulatory framework has not been 
established as of early 2012.
As well, minorities in a few of the CORENCHI communities remain opposed 
to the strict conservation policies that came from both the government programs 
and community statutes, and continue to agitate in the assemblies for the now-
denied right to place corn fields in fertile soils in the PHS area and to carry out 
subsistence hunting in the ICCA. Tensions over these issues have been raised by 
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the fact that SINGO-8 has taken a strong advocacy position for this minority in 
public settings. As well, recent research in one of the CORENCHI communities has 
suggested that the cumulative impact of the rules on corn field location and hunting 
associated with the PHS and ICCA  programs have reduced food sovereignty 
and could lead to a decline in traditional knowledge of hunting and the territory 
(Ibarra et al. 2011). However, the community has the right to abrogate the PHS 
contract and change the community restrictions on hunting, so these tendencies are 
reversible, if the community chooses. There has already been one case in Mexico 
where a community has asked for its ICCA to be revoked because of opposition 
by a minority of community members over rights to locate agricultural fields in 
the area (Schmidt 2010), and this possibility cannot be ruled out in some of the 
CORENCHI communities. For now, the majority of the community assemblies 
appear to support the strict conservation programs, whatever its trade-offs. Figel 
et al. (2011) carried out 156 interviews in four CORENCHI communities and 
found that 93% of respondents support the conservation initiatives. Nieratka (2011) 
found in a survey of two of the CORENCHI communities that 72% of a sample 
felt that payments from the PHS program were worth the restrictions placed on 
forest use. It is clearly the PHS program that has provided the most significant 
economic incentive for the six communities to undertake and maintain collective 
action around strict conservation (Nieratka 2011). However, this variable alone 
does not explain the emergence of inter-community collective action. Since 2004, 
the PHS program has made payments to over 5400 communities and private 
land owners in Mexico (CONAFOR 2010), and CORENCHI appears to be the 
most mature and geographically extensive case of community collective action 
connected to the program.
We do not know why inter-community collective action stimulated by the 
PHS program apparently did not emerge elsewhere in Mexico. Here we can only 
propose some tentative independent variables that had consequences for land 
use and the community pursuit of a conservation and multi-scale governance 
strategy in the CORENCHI case. These include (1) the collapse and subsequent 
instability of coffee prices that caused emigration, (2) the role of emigration 
in reducing land use pressure and lowering opportunity costs for conservation, 
(3) the emergence of visionary, ecologically informed leadership that became 
convinced of the environmental value of their forests beyond any immediate 
utilitarian value, but who were also focused on articulating with new sources 
of funding from conservation, and (4) the arrival of national and international 
programs that emphasized and provided varying economic incentives for 
conservation, primarily from the PHS, but also from various other smaller 
sources of support. The process that emerged from the interaction of these 
variables built upon the social capital at the community level, increasing trust 
between leaders, and leaders who could communicate that trust to the more 
mistrustful assemblies, and outside actors. In an evaluation of experiences 
in collective action (or “self-organization”) of communities that had won 
the Equator prize, Seixas and Davy (2008) argue that the six key elements 
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to success were: (1) involvement and commitment of key players (including 
communities), (2) funding, (3) strong leadership, (4) capacity building, (5) 
partnership with supportive organizations and government, and (6) economic 
incentives (including alternative livelihood options) and that initiatives 
“opportunistically evolve in a multi-level world, in which local communities 
establish linkages with people and organizations at different political levels, 
across different geographic scales and for different purposes” (Seixas and Davy 
2008). These elements track the independent variables and the dynamics of the 
CORENCHI experience, although the outcomes of inter-community collective 
action for strict conservation, and the centrality of capacity to negotiate at 
multiple levels in turbulent settings, are not analyzed in the Seixas and Davy 
(2008) sample.
5. Conclusions
In our conclusions we will move beyond the particulars of our heuristic, outlier 
case study (George and Bennett 2005) and use it to propose an extension of some 
of the constitutive elements (Goertz 2005) of concepts of common property 
management and success on the commons, and some of the possible outcomes 
that can characterize it. This proposed extension incorporates not only the current 
case study but similar strands of thinking and empirical research that emerge from 
recent literature. These include the phenomenon of inter-community collective 
action (Antinori and Garcia 2008; Paudel et al. 2010) and that the dynamic 
multi-scale nature of contemporary commons management is not captured by the 
concept of nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, and governance 
(Agrawal 2001). Contemporary commons management, when rights have been 
defined or are in a process of definition, takes place in a context of turbulent multi-
scale governance where communities, governments, NGOs, and international 
organizations must constantly negotiate the rules and resolve conflicts on the fly 
over governance of harvests, territories, market access and government subsidies, 
and monitoring and enforcement of co-produced rules at multiple levels (Alcorn 
et al. 2003; Berkes 2007; Seixas and Davy 2008; Cronkleton et al. 2011).
Table 2 represents an effort to show how traditional common property 
theory may be extended to take into account these empirical realities of 
contemporary commons management. In the first column we find listed the 
factors or core subsystems (Ostrom 2009; Agrawal 2001) which provide a first 
level of the definition of the central elements of successful common property 
management. In the second column, we present a summarized listing of the 
secondary elements or “critical enabling conditions” synthesized by (Agrawal 
2001). In the third column we present the new constitutive elements that we 
proposed based on the CORENCHI case study and other recent literature cited 
above, and in the final column new outcomes which can define success on the 
commons.
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Expanding the number of variables and possible outcomes in common 
property research does not make the analytical task any easier (Agrawal 2001). 
The case study we have presented here adds some new elements that can constitute 
common property theory: 
 that the resource has value for strict conservation and generation of •	
environmental service
 that there are possibilities of realizing that value through extensive networks•	
 that communities and inter-community organizations can establish rules •	
for strict conservation with no physical harvests within a framework for 
coproduction of rules at multiple scales
 that collective action can crucially take place at the inter-community level, •	
providing an efficient link with other levels and scales of governance
 that visionary leaders can overcome locally confined solidarities, and that •	
conflicts are not adjudicated but negotiated in complex, turbulent settings at 
multiple scales.
It also proposes new outcomes that can define success on the commons, 
particularly strict conservation for environmental services and inter-community 
collective action. Turbulent multi-scale governance based on communities can 
be a general setting, an independent variable or an outcome depending on the 
analysis carried out. We finally suggest that single case studies continue to be 
relevant when they expand our understanding of the universe of variables and 
outcomes that contribute to success on the multi-scale commons (Agrawal 2001; 
George and Bennett 2005).
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